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The Empty
Promise
Elaine Werby

This article reviews the federal role in providing rental housing for lowincome households. It suggests that reliance on the private market has
characterized the variety of programs designed to meet the housing needs
of this population group. Despite some progress, millions of low-income
households still lack stable, secure housing that they can afford, and the
major current program of rent subsidies is under attack.

n the Housing Act of 1949, Congress declared: “the general welfare and
security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people
require . . . the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and
suitable living environment for every American Family.”

I

More than fifty years later, the failure, of American housing policy, if
indeed there was one, is apparent in the growing homeless population, the
numbers of working families seeking shelter, and the increasing length of
shelter stays. An Urban Institute report indicates, “at least 2.3 million adults
and children, or nearly 1 percent of the U.S. population, are likely to experience a spell of homelessness at least once during a year.”1
Homelessness in Massachusetts is on the rise. The number of people in
emergency shelters throughout the state increased by 16 percent from 1998 to
2003. Roughly 29,000 individuals, without accompanying family, lived in
Massachusetts shelters in 2003.2 How can this be? The goal was noble. What
has gone wrong?
From its earliest involvement in housing the federal government has embraced “an ideology of privatization”3 and demonstrated a commitment to the
real estate industry — developers, mortgage bankers, landlords, and their
national associations.4 While not the first example of this commitment, the
1937 Housing Act reflects concessions made to the real estate industry in
order to gain their support for passage of this landmark housing legislation.
Slum clearance and new “low cost” housing to replace lost units assured jobs
Elaine Werby is senior fellow at the Center for Social Policy (CSP) at University of
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and profits for the construction industry. These politics continue to play an
important role as successive administrations and Congress attempt to meet the
challenge of providing housing for low- and very low- income households.

Public Housing
In the 1960s, public housing was the primary source of assisted housing for
low-income households, and its image was changing. Occupancy by a new and
increasingly black tenant population, deteriorating physical structures with
growing numbers of vacancies, and the presence of the many social problems
associated with poverty characterized most large urban developments. In the
late 1960s, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
established a modernization program to address the physical and social needs
of these developments. Modernization funding continued to be available up to
the early 1990s, though funding for the operating subsidy declined, and more
developments fell into disrepair.
In response to recommendations by a national commission, 1992 federal
legislation provided funding for a revitalization program, known as HOPE VI,
a competitive grant intended to “improve the living environment for public
housing residents . . . through demolition, rehabilitation, or replacement” of
severely distressed public housing developments. HOPE VI grants to local
housing authorities allow for mixed finance development and partnerships
(nonprofit, public, private), mixed tenure (rental, home ownership) and mixed
income. This legislation represents the most dramatic change in the history of
the public housing program. Supporters of the legislation heralded ending
segregation of the poor by creating new mixed income communities, while
critics focused on the loss of units for low- and very low-income residents.
Three developments in the city of Boston have received HOPE VI funding; two
projects were demolished and replaced by new rental housing; work is ongoing
in a third project. Each of these three transformations was made possible
through the mixed finance approach involving both public and private sectors
and funding sources; a majority of units are earmarked as “public housing”
for which the housing authority still receives an annual federal contribution, a
portion of which is passed along to the private owner.5 Not all HOPE VI
developments, however, have followed this pattern of retaining most units as
public housing.
Massachusetts is one of only three states with a public housing program,
once known as veterans housing. Over the last decades, 1600 units of this
housing have been lost due to density reduction or conversion to mixedfinance redevelopments.2 Legislative approval of the demolition of a Lowell
project paved the way for a plan, modeled on HOPE VI principles of mixed
ownership, income, and tenure, replacing the 284-unit project with a 180-unit
development, with 110 of the units set aside to serve low-income households.
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Other Massachusetts communities with state-aided housing have expressed
interest in the Lowell experience and would like to follow the same pattern.

Public Private Partnerships
The public private partnerships allowed in the HOPE VI program do not
represent a new approach by the federal government. The change in image and
condition of public housing, along with the civil rights movement, general
urban unrest, and urban renewal created a demand for new housing opportunities and led to new federal programs. In Boston, the demand gave rise to
notorious red-lining by some of the leading financial institutions in the city, a
no-lending practice that changed an entire area of the city. After this practice
was made public in Congressional hearings, it was then replaced by greenlining, or targeted lending.
Writing just six years after passage of the Economic Opportunity Act,
Michael Stone3 whose article on shelter poverty appears elsewhere in this
journal, wrote:
The crucial decisions in the housing sector — as in most major
areas of this society —are not made primarily on the basis of
human needs. Instead, the important decisions revolve around the
flow of investment capital into housing, and these decisions of
course are made on the basis of opportunities for profit.

Indeed, profits were available for the real estate industry, and to perhaps a
lesser extent, the construction industry, in the various 1960s federal housing
programs that were designed to stimulate the development of privately owned
housing for low-income households. Under Section 221(d)(3) of the 1961
Housing Act, and later under the 1968 Section 236 program, HUD provided
interest subsidies to private for-profit and nonprofit developers who agreed to
keep some or all of their units affordable to low- and moderate-income households for a twenty year period. It soon was apparent that this housing, like
public housing, needed deeper subsidies in order to keep rents within reach of
low-income households while still covering operating costs. In response, in 1974,
Congress created the Section 8 rent subsidy program of tenant-based subsidies,
which could be used in existing housing, and two Section 8 project-based
programs for new construction and substantial rehabilitation. Under the latter
programs, HUD contracted to provide rent subsidies for up to forty years to
specific developments to bridge the gap between rents needed to meet costs and
a percentage of tenants’ income. Developers used this guarantee to obtain
construction financing from other sources, thus diminishing the financial institutions’ risk. In 1983 Congress terminated funding for any additional projectbased units beyond those already in the pipeline. But by 1996 there were close to
60,000 units in Section 8 project-based developments in Massachusetts.
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The tenant-based Section 8 program began in the mid 1970s with the
federal government providing financial assistance directly to very low-income
households in the form of a voucher to rent private housing that they located
on their own. Under the program as currently operated, tenants pay 30 percent of their income toward the rent, and HUD pays the private landlord the
difference between that amount and the full rent, up to a HUD determined fair
market rent (FMR) for the area. In the 1990s Congress merged earlier types of
rent subsidies into one, the Housing Choice Voucher program. According to a
summer 2004 report by the National Low Income Housing Coalition, nearly
two million vouchers are currently in use by low-income households; thousands more eligible applicants are on waiting lists for them.
Despite the popularity of both Section 8 programs, they are not without
their problems. In the project-based Section 8 program, most for-profit owners
were subject to “use restrictions” to assure their affordability for low-income
households and to limit their profit margin during their twenty-year mortgage.
By the mid 1980s, many of the oldest private subsidized projects were eligible
for prepayment of their mortgages, thereby releasing them from these restrictions. Developers of these projects now had the opportunity to convert them to
market rate developments. Through the present time, the expiring use of many
of these federally subsidized rental properties has resulted in a substantial loss
of housing for low-income households.
While a mainstay for the current two million voucher holders, the tenantbased Section 8 program, is not without its operational and administrative
problems. For the low-income family fortunate enough to secure a voucher, the
search for a safe housing unit within the fair market rent limits, in a desirable
community, and with a landlord willing to accept the voucher is a challenge. In
fact, during the housing boom of the 1990s tight rental market, many families,
unable to find a unit, were forced to turn back their vouchers. In the Massachusetts high-cost housing market, landlords could and did command high
rents and could choose to be selective, opting for tenants who could afford
their high rents. Discriminatory practices against minority tenants and families
with children were not unknown.
Still, the voucher program, along with public housing, is a major resource
for very low-income families. Administrative regulations require 75 percent of
all new vouchers to be allocated to households with incomes at or below 30
percent of the area median income (AMI), and the remainder (25 percent)
distributed to families with incomes up to 80 percent of AMI. These regulations have protected this rental assistance program for low-income households. The program has been heralded as giving families flexibility in locating
their housing and reducing concentrations of the poor. Vouchers are highly
prized by low-income households: securing a voucher is a triumphal moment;
though finding a unit can be a daunting experience.
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Disappointments
Despite the popularity of the vouchers, funding for them has not been consistent. No new vouchers were approved by Congress in FY03 or FY04. As of
this writing, Congress has yet to act on the HUD FY05 appropriation bills in
either the Senate or the House. The future of the program is far from assured.
Further, changes in the 2005 Fair Market Rents for the Housing Choice
Voucher Program, announced though not yet final, have set lower rents in
some areas, while increasing them in others. In Boston, for example, the Fair
Market Rents (or FMRs) for all size units, other than 0-bedroom, have been
reduced. For voucher holders, this will no doubt add to the existing burden of
finding housing within allowable rents.
The housing needs of the low-income population are frequently lost in
current discussions of housing affordability. In the past, the term affordability
referred to the needs of low-income households. Currently, the focus of
affordability has turned to the needs of public servants such as the police,
firefighters, and teachers who can no longer afford to live in the communities
they serve. Concern for these populations is a response to the not-in-mybackyard phenomenon, as developers seek to produce affordable housing that
is acceptable to local communities. In several Massachusetts communities this
question of affordability has been central as developers propose new projects
under the Chapter 40B statute that requires that 10 percent of the housing
stock in every community be designated as affordable to low-income households. The statute allows the state zoning board to override local zoning
boards when the developer proposes to set aside a percentage of a development for low-income households. As affected neighborhoods protest developments due to concerns varying from increased density to school enrollment,
and public service costs, developers define affordability as housing for the
community’s adult children and public servants. Easing zoning restrictions and
building regulations to encourage new housing construction, frequently cited
by developers as a cure for the “housing affordability crisis,” may be needed
to promote more production, but costs involved in new housing place it well
above the income limits of low-income households.
From the “trickle down” philosophy to the provision of rent subsidies to the
low-income tax credit offered to developers, the federal government has relied
upon and underscored the role of the private market in meeting the housing
needs of low-income households. (See Abramovitz and Kurland in this issue).
Without adequate income support, low-income families and individuals cannot
compete in the housing market. With the prevailing philosophy of an “ownership society,” as declared by the current administration, and its concomitant
emphasis on personal responsibility, the security of a home for low-income
households remains a distant dream.

105

Notes
1. “Millions Still Face Homelessness in a Booming Economy,” Press Release, Urban Institute,
Washington, D.C., February 01, 2000.
2. Hard Numbers, Hard Times, Five Years of Data from Massachusetts’s Homeless Management
Information System, Center for Social Policy, McCormack School of Public Policy, University of
Massachusetts Boston, July 2004.
3. Kevin Fox Gotham, “A City Without Slums,” American Journal of Economic and Sociology,
January 2001.
4. Ronald Dale Karr, “Shelter the American Way, New England Journal of Public Policy, 1992, 8.
no.1. 169-184; Peter Drier, Richard Appelbaum, “The Housing Crisis Enters the 1990s,” New
England Journal of Public Policy, 8, no. 1, 1992, 155–168.
5. Telephone Interview with Boston Housing Authority staff, October 7, 2004.
6. John Stanton & Charleen Regan, Protecting the Commonwealth’s Investment: Securing the
Future of State-Aided Public Housing, Citizens Housing and Planning Association, June 2001.
7. Michael E. Stone, “The Politics of Housing: Mortgage Bankers,” Society, 9, no. 9, 1972, 31–37.

106

